The Diverging Interpretations Around the Legal Notion of Hate Speech: a Valuable Contribution By Natalie Alkiviadou Looking Into The Case Law Of The European Court Of Human Rights

June 3, 2026

[Editor’s note: this is a review of Dr. Natalie Alkiviadou’s new book, Hate Speech and the European Court of Human Rights (Routledge 2025)].

The notion of hate speech has always been a problematic legal artifact in international human rights law. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides a balanced approach by framing the scope and main pillars of the right to freedom of expression while at the same time establishing clear criteria regarding the possibilities for States to introduce limitations or restrictions. Article 20 addresses the issue of limits with a different tone and technique. It basically introduces straightforward prohibitions in relation to two big categories: propaganda for war and advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (usually known as illegal hate speech).

Despite their differences, articles 19 and 20 are obviously interrelated. Even indirectly, the main spirit of the three-part test enshrined in the former clearly permeates (or should permeate) the interpretation and application of the latter. Therefore, the need for clear legal definitions of hate speech, the protection of the dignity of vulnerable groups and characteristics as a legitimate purpose, and the demand for a graduated approach when it comes to legal instruments and penalties are fundamental principles to be considered by legislators and those enforcing the law. They have also inspired additional standards, such as the well-known Rabat Plan of Action, aimed at avoiding the misuse of this category to curb merely uncomfortable speech.

This being said, and as it is well explained in Alkiviadou’s book, the international instruments that provide specific approaches to the notion of hate speech are not necessarily uniform as to the thresholds that would trigger the respective legal prohibitions. The book highlights the high threshold incorporated into the universal human rights system based on the ICCPR and the Rabat Plan of Action, the more moderate threshold provided by the European Union via the Framework Decision, and the more complex and often inconsistent approach of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) based on the provisions contained in the European Convention as a “living instrument”. The study also points to the reality of hate speech definitions and restrictions as established under online platforms’ corporate policies for purposes of commercial safety and specific business models. In these last cases, the threshold tends to be quite expansive and allows for the restriction and elimination of vaguely defined categories of “hateful” speech such as slurs or dehumanization. 

The book dedicates its central and most extensive part to the trajectory of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area, and by extension, to the protections granted and the limits that can be legitimately imposed on freedom of expression in cases of offensive, hateful and extremist speech. Based on an exhaustive analysis of the most significant judgments in this area, Alkiviadou’s dissection of the evolution of the jurisprudence represents a critical analysis of the way the European human rights system validates certain limitations to freedom of expression and pluralism as pillars of a democratic society. Taking as a point of departure the foundational formulation by the Court in Handyside v the United Kingdom of the right to “shock, disturb and offend”, the author provides us with significant evidence of the jurisprudential abandonment of the rigorous scrutiny required to justify state interference with expression.

Among the specific flaws detected and categorized by the author in the mentioned areas I should particularly underscore the absence of a substantive, unified definition of hate speech across the jurisprudence, leading to arbitrary and unpredictable adjudication; the regression, in some cases toward a “low-threshold” paradigm where mere insult, ridicule, prejudice, or political attacks against certain groups justifies criminal sanctions; the related failure to require objective evidence of “actual harm,” relying instead on normative assertions and vague fears of social instability, the inconsistent application of the “abuse of rights” clause under article 17 of the Convention and its relation with the limitations enshrined in article 10; as well as the favorable consideration of “hate speech by proxy” determinations by national courts which shift liability from speakers to intermediaries in ways that might be inconsistent with international and national regulatory models and best practices in this area.

This book thus shows that, when it comes to hate speech, the ECtHR may have been tempted by the idea of supporting “militant democracy” approaches, where the requirement of imminence or proven risk of harm is replaced with the perception of a mere prospect of societal intolerance.

In sum, Natalie Alkiviadou has produced a unique and solid scrutiny of the case law of the ECtHR in cases of hate speech. The book does not only show the analytical shortcomings and inconsistencies of judgements in this area, but it also invites to adopt a more stringent approach based on a resolute defense of the right to express shocking, disturbing and offensive ideas, and where possible restrictions (either based on article 10 or article 17 of the Convention) are subject to a strict scrutiny for harm following clear scientific evidence or sociological data. All these principles will not only provide proper protection to freedom of expression in the continent in times of serious demise but will also preserve the obvious legitimacy of the Court as a human rights arbiter in the international arena.